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Abstract
The notion of Return in many ways epitomizes the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The Palestinian Right of Return, one
embodiment of this notion, has constituted a hurdle in the
parties’ attempts to reach a sustainable agreement. Rather
than regard the conflict as of zero-sum nature, this paper
assumes that Palestinians and Israelis, in their negotia-
tions on the Right of Return and other issues, do not hear
each other, and in fact are seldom speaking the same lan-
guage even when it seems they are discussing the same is-
sue. It examines the ways in which Israelis and
Palestinians understand the issue of Return, and suggests
a number of factors that influence their different under-
standings – as well as what each is able to hear from the o-
ther. A sustainable agreement would have to take these
factors into account in its formulation and in the way in
which it is delivered to both peoples.
Résumé
La notion de Droit au retour incarne le conflit israélo-pa-
lestinien de plusieurs manières. Le Droit au retour des
Palestiniens est l’une des incarnations de cette notion, et
il s’est révélé être un obstacle dans la recherche d’un ac-
cord durable entre les deux parties. Plutôt que de considé-
rer le conflit comme étant de nature « jeu à somme
nulle », cet article propose la thèse que dans leurs négocia-
tions sur le Droit au retour et sur d’autres questions, Pa-
lestiniens et Israéliens n’entendent pas vraiment ce qu’ils
se disent l’un l’autre. En fait, ils parlent rarement le
même langage même lorsqu’ils semblent discuter de la
même question. L’article examine la manière divergente
dont Palestiniens et Israéliens comprennent la question
du Retour, et propose comme explication un certain nom-
bre de facteurs qui pèse aussi bien sur leur compréhen-
sion divergente que ce qu’ils arrivent à entendre les uns
des autres. Tout accord durable devra prendre ces fac-
teurs en ligne de compte, aussi bien dans sa formulation
que dans la façon dont il sera présenté aux deux peuples.
Introduction
T
he notion of “Return” is central in the collective
memories and national ethos of Jews and Palesti-
nians. For Jews it has, for millennia, carried mainly
religious connotations, while in more recent history its mea-
ning has become – for Jews and Palestinians alike – mostly
political, in many ways epitomizing the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and embodying its very essence. The issue has thus
far constituted a hurdle in the two peoples’ attempts to reach
a sustainable, peaceful agreement. Notions of Return are
closely linked to the concepts of “Diaspora” and “refugees,”
and all are, in the given context, most clearly embodied in
the idea of the “Right of Return,” as it applies to Jews and
Palestinians alike.
While there is much to say about Jewish Return, this
paper will focus on the Palestinian Right of Return as an
important issue in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and a
central concept in the conflict. However, it will make refer-
ence to Jewish notions of Return, which have existed for
millennia, in order to help clarify Jewish attitudes towards,
and understandings of, the Palestinian Right of Return.
In the eyes of some, the Right of Return constitutes, in a
sense, the bare bedrock1 upon which other layers of the
conflict are mounted, and discourse and discursive proces-
ses surrounding it mirror larger processes taking place
within the context of the conflict.
On the one hand, the Jewish Right of Return – institu-
tionalized through Israel’s Law of Return – is a central
element of the Jewish national ethos (at the core of Zio-
nism) and a main tenet upon which the State of Israel was
established. Similarly, the Palestinian Right of Return is a
central constituent of Palestinians’ collective identity and na-
tional aspirations. Each people views the right as unquestio-
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nable and irrevocable with regard to itself, while illegitimate
at best with regard to the other.
A resolution, or agreement, concerning the Right of
Return is essential to any future sustainable peace, though
it is still one of the main stumbling blocks on the road to
reaching an agreement.2 One of the many myths prevalent
during the Oslo Peace Process, mainly among Israelis, was
that the “occupation” (of the West Bank and Gaza) was all
that stood  in  the  way  of  reconciliation.3 Recent events,
especially the Intifada raging since September 2000, suggest
that the Right of Return, in fact intrinsically related to the
eruption of the Intifada in the first place, is very much alive
and still very pertinent.
In Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in Taba, in December
2000-January 2001, an agreement regarding Palestinian
Refugees was almost reached, yet for a number of reasons
it was not signed. In spite of this very significant break-
through, those who might have signed such an agreement
would have likely had a very difficult time delivering it to
their respective constituencies.
A Dialogue of the Deaf?
The conflict’s intractability is often attributed to mutual
misconceptions, though some claim that in fact Palestinians
and Israelis know exactly what the other side wants, and that
this is incongruent with what they themselves want.4 This
may explain some of what takes place, mainly, perhaps, at
the top leadership level. But it does not, I believe, account
for the whole story.
The Right of Return is one of the most difficult and
sensitive topics for Palestinians and Israelis to deal with
because it hits at the very heart of the conflict. It cannot be
truly addressed without tackling other core issues, such as
the parties’ legitimacy and right to exist as sovereign in the
land, and the responsibility for the events of 1948. While
much of the discussions and agreements reached in the
context of the Oslo Accords consider 1967 as a reference
point, the Right of Return forces the parties to deal with the
history and consequences of 1948, and possibly even earlier.
The  different understandings of and reactions to  the
Right of Return stem not only from the different political
realities in which Palestinians and Israelis live, but largely
from the different symbolic repertoires, manifested
through culture and language, in which Israelis and Pales-
tinians are immersed and operate.5
The conflict is usually seen as one of zero-sum nature,
and the Right of Return, more than anything else perhaps,
embodies this mutual exclusivity of claims and existence.
The impasse with regard to the Right of Return is thus
significantly related to its practical ramifications, as well as
to the different understandings of the issue (based on cul-
tural and linguistic contexts) and its place at the very heart
of the conflict. The nature of the interaction between these
factors, and their relative salience, must be better understood
if an agreement or resolution of some sort is to be reached.
Whether being “deaf” is a circumstantial phenomenon
or a strategic choice, a “dialogue of the deaf” seems to be
taking place around the Right of Return, related to and
indicative of Palestinian-Israeli communication at large.
Some leaders have been close to reaching an agreement of
some sort. They have, perhaps, come a long way in trying
to untangle the difficult knot the issue constitutes. How-
ever, Israeli and Palestinian societies at large are still not
really hearing anything but themselves. Some of the crucial
questions remaining are why this is the case: Why does the
issue indeed constitute such a hurdle? Is it really of zero-
sum nature? Why does it seem that neither side is able to
hear what the other is saying, or see the issue in shades of
gray, rather than in black or white?
In order for any progress to be made, it is essential to
understand why neither people hears the other, what might
enable them to hear each other better, and ultimately what
might be an outcome that both peoples could accept and
live with. If we somehow unravel the issue, decipher what
each people is actually saying, what dynamics influence the
discourse on the Right of Return, and why each people
seems to be “deaf” to the other, we could perhaps come up
with a resolution that not only addresses the issue, but
words and delivers it in a way that can be heard and accep-
ted by both.
The Right of Return: Some Legal and Historical
Landmarks
The Palestinian Right of Return is based on UN Resolution
194, which states that:
[T]he refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace
with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest
practical date, and…compensation should be paid for the pro-
perty of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to
property which, under principles of international law or in
equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities
responsible.6
The centrality of the Right of Return in the conflict has
gone through several stages. At the end of the 1948 War the
Israeli government expressed its willingness to absorb one
hundred thousand refugees, approximately 15 per cent of
the Palestinian refugees in 1949. Around thirty thousand
returned through “family reunification,” but the problem
of all the rest was left unresolved. Until 1967 the refugee
issue was at the top of the agenda of the Palestine Liberation
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Organization (PLO) (since its establishment) and the Arab
states. However, after the 1967 war and the ascent of the
PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, the
refugee issue became less openly prominent; instead, the
issue of Palestinian self-determination was now central. In
reality, however, the PLO continued to demand the Right
of Return and the refugees’ plight was one of its main
sources of power.7
The Middle East peace process, initiated in Madrid in
1991, recognized the issue of refugees as one which must be
addressed on both regional (Arab-Israeli) and bilateral (Pa-
lestinian-Israeli) levels. In the framework of the Oslo Ac-
cords of 1993, the issue of refugees, along with those of
Jewish settlements, borders, water, and Jerusalem, was to
be addressed at the “final status” negotiations, which were
initially to have been concluded within five years.8
The Refugee Working Group (RWG) was established in
1992, under the framework of the Arab-Israeli multilateral
peace talks generated in Madrid, and later on, in 1995, the
Continuing Committee for Displaced Persons was estab-
lished.9 Ever since, the refugee issue has been addressed in
various forums, mainly in second-track diplomatic efforts
(these included participants from Israeli and Palestinian
NGOs, as well as policy and opinion makers).
Understanding the issue’s complexity, discussions con-
cerning it were left to the final stages of negotiations be-
tween Israelis and Palestinians in the framework of the Oslo
Accords.10 Not surprisingly, the collapse of the Oslo talks in
the summer of 2000 was closely linked to impasses between
the parties with regard to the Right of Return.11
At the Taba negotiations in late 2000 and early 2001 a
breakthrough was made, though mostly on an individual
level, by a few negotiators who did not necessarily represent
the general feelings among their respective two peoples and
who, at that point, may not have been able to deliver such
an agreement had it been signed.12
Furthermore, the centrality of the refugees and refugee
camps in the Palestinian struggle and steadfast resistance
during the current Intifada, on the one hand, and the harsh
Israeli “reprisals” particularly in recent months, geared
mainly at the camps, on the other hand, is not coincidental.
The refugee camps have always served as one of the main
“hotbeds” of Palestinian nationalism, and much of the
Palestinian resistance has thus emanated from the camps.
The refugees in many ways epitomize the essence of the
Palestinian struggle, and the refugees were the ones who
feared being forsaken by the Palestinian leadership were
unsatisfactory agreements to be signed which would have
relinquished their rights. In addition, since the signing of
the Oslo Accords, the situation on the ground for refugees
had worsened, mainly in that the per capita income (via
UNRWA) was lower than it had previously been, because
of the new ways in which moneys were being funneled.
Overall, disillusionment among refugees was extremely
high. The centrality of the refugee issue and refugee camps
in the September 2000 Intifada is a result of all of the above,
and the Israeli reprisals aimed mainly at the camps serve to
heighten and perpetuate their centrality.
Jewish/Israeli Notions of “Return,” “Refugees,”
and “Right”
Modern political Zionism drew upon existing religious no-
tions of a Jewish Return to Zion, which many Jews had
harbored over the centuries. For many centuries Jews, who
had previously been expelled from the Land of Zion – Israel
– saw themselves as living in the Diaspora and awaiting their
return to their land. Zionism, which managed to mobilize
Jews based on these and other sentiments, and which culmi-
nated in the establishment of the State of Israel, remained
the hegemonic state ideology. The Return of Jews to their
ancestral land, rather than just a religious notion, became
one of the cornerstones of the Jewish State.
Notions of “refugee-ness” heightened among Jews fol-
lowing World War II and the Holocaust, and Israel, more
than before, came to be viewed a safe haven for Jews around
the world. Shortly following the establishment of the State
of Israel, thousands of Jewish refugees poured into Israel
from various Arab countries due to hostilities and persecu-
tion. Israel, in fact, organized campaigns (such as airlifts)
aimed at rescuing Jews from these countries. In the early
1950s there were many “transitory” camps (Ma’abarot) in
Israel, which were, in essence, refugee camps.
Thus, in the minds of most Jewish Israelis the notion of
refugees  refers  not only,  or even mainly, to  Palestinian
refugees of 1948 – a loaded and controversial issue in itself
– but rather to what they see as a parallel phenomenon of
Jewish refugees: first from Europe, and later from Arab
lands. Since these Jewish refugees were absorbed into the
Jewish state, thereby obliterating the Jewish “refugee prob-
lem,” there is a refusal to understand or accept that the same
was not done on the Arab side. In other words, a parallel is
drawn between the Jewish and Palestinian refugee pro-
blems, following which there are parallel expectations from
the Palestinians and the Arab world to have resolved the
Palestinian refugee problem, and corresponding demands
from the Arab states to compensate the Jewish refugees. The
Palestinian refugee issue is thus linked to the larger issue of
Middle East refugees, and a solution is perceived only in
some larger context. The fact that the Palestinians are a
different “entity” than any given Arab country from which
Jewish refugees fled is irrelevant. In fact, most Israeli Jews
see Palestinians and Arabs as one and the same.
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Jews and Jewish refugees “returned” to their historical
homeland – and “home” is perceived as anywhere that
Jewish sovereignty exists. It is difficult, therefore, to under-
stand that “home” may mean something slightly different
(perhaps much more specific, e.g., a village or town) to
most Palestinians.
The closest referent in the Jewish-Israeli national psyche
to the concept of the Right of Return is the Israeli “Law of
Return” (based on the Jewish Right of Return), which
allows any Jew to immigrate to Israel and become a citizen
of the state. This law, adopted by Israel in 1950, was a form
of “affirmative action,” allowing Jews, previously persecu-
ted and denied rights in other countries, to seek a safe haven
in Israel.
The Hebrew word for “Right” (Zekhut) seems to have a
legalistic, implementation-based undertone. The combina-
tion of the Hebrew words “Right” (Zekhut) and “Return”
(Shvut, Shiva), which clearly connote the Law of Return in
the minds of most Israeli Jews, strengthens this implemen-
tation-based notion. Hence, perhaps this exacerbates Israe-
lis’ difficulty or inability to conceive of a right as having a
modified implementation or being separate from its com-
plete actualization, and thus they seemingly cannot avoid
the conflation of two (possibly) quite different matters: the
Palestinian Right to Return and the actual return of the
Palestinians.13
Palestinian Notions of “Refugees,” “Return,” and
“Right”
To Palestinians, May 1948 marked a crucial watershed in
their personal and collective history. In the process of popu-
lation displacement, which continued until the conclusion
of the armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jor-
dan, Lebanon, and Syria in 1949, half of Palestine’s 1.4
million Arabs were uprooted from their homes and became
refugees. The traditional political and social leadership was
scattered,  and the Palestinian  social  web was destroyed.
These traumatic events of 1947–49, which cost the Palesti-
nian their majority status in Palestine and their hope of
controlling the country, and cost half of them their homes,
land, and property, are inscribed in Palestinian memory and
historiography as al-Nakba, “the Catastrophe.”
One of the main elements of Palestinian identity (before
1948 and thereafter) was the attachment to a specific locale
– a home, a village, or a city. Given this fact, the impact of
the events of 1947–49 was even more powerful. By 1949
more than four hundred cities, towns, and villages had been
depopulated, incorporated into Israel and settled with Jews,
and most of their Arab inhabitants became refugees, dis-
persed throughout the region.
The Catastrophe of 1948, rather than causing the absorp-
tion of Palestinian refugees into neighbouring Arab coun-
tries, reinforced pre-existing elements of self-definition that
were already present. In spite of the existence of a variety of
different identities, the shared events of 1948 brought the
Palestinians closer together in terms of their collective con-
sciousness, even though physically they were dispersed all
over the Middle East and beyond. 1948 erased many pre-
existing differences, and the Nakba thus came ultimately to
serve as one of the most important aspects of Palestinian
identity and a source of shared beliefs and values.14
The 1967 war was yet another watershed in Palestinian
identity, and served to reinforce the Palestinian national
movement. On the one hand, the Arab armies had been
defeated by Israel, disillusioning many Palestinians who
had hoped their salvation would come from neighbouring
Arab countries. In effect, 1967 symbolized the end of Pan-
Arabism. The Arab countries exhibited and emphasized
more localized identities, in line with nation-state bounda-
ries and frames of reference. This change in ideology did
not leave much choice for the Palestinians, who had anyway
ceased to put their faith in the hands of other Arab leaders
and states. The end of Pan-Arabism was therefore a signi-
ficant factor in enhancing an independent Palestinian na-
tional identity.15
On the other hand, the entire West Bank, previously
under Jordanian rule, and in fact all of mandatory Palestine,
were now under Israeli control (including the Gaza Strip,
previously under Egyptian military rule). This ended efforts
to “Jordanize” the Palestinians, and eventually the pro-Jor-
danian elite in the West Bank gave way to a Palestinian
nationalist elite. It also brought previously separated Pales-
tinian communities together. The PLO, which was officially
formed in 1964, now became a broad-based national mo-
vement organized as a proto-state.16
For over fifty years there has been an ongoing struggle
over the preservation and re-creation of the Palestinian
identity, which has taken place in a few loci: the refugee
camps in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria and
Jordan, which preserved the identity of displaced refugees
intending to return to their homes; the population in the
major Palestinian cities, such as Nablus; and the “satellite”
Palestinian communities in the Diaspora, which eventually
served as a hotbed for national and rebellious activities.
Memories of destroyed villages and towns, and of the
events of 1948, play a central role in Palestinian con-
sciousness. The Deir Yassin massacre, committed by Irgun
forces in 1948, was crucial in heightening Palestinian fears
at the time and in heightening the flow of refugees. It has
been, ever since, a central theme in the narration of Pales-
tinian history, and has had a great impact on how Palesti-
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nians saw (and still see) their enemies. Palestinian identity
has, ever since 1948, been in many ways constructed of the
experience of dispossession, homelessness, insecurity, and
uprootedness.17
No one embodies these feelings more than the refugees
themselves. Indeed, the concept of Ghurba, or exile, is a
major component of Palestinian identity. In addition, a
distinct identity and character developed in the camps
themselves, and in those outside the mandatory borders of
Palestine the situation was different than that in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip camps. A major agent in instilling
Palestinian consciences among the camp refugees was the
educational system established by the United Nations Relief
and Work Agency (UNRWA). For many Palestinians, the
core of the conflict, from which all else flows, is the refugee
issue. They see their dispossession by Israel in 1948 as the
defining element in the modern history of their people, as
well as in the entire Arab-Israeli conflict.18
The term “refugee” does not, in the Palestinian mind,
refer only to those living in and around camps and defined
by UNRWA as refugees. The concept is a central theme in
the personal and collective identity of many Palestinians,
and applies to anyone who fled or was forced out of their
home, regardless of their official “status” today. Thus, there
are in fact many more Palestinians who would identify
themselves as refugees than any UN or other figures might
show, and “refugee” is more a matter of identity than an
operational definition.
The Arabic term for “Right of Return” (Haq al-’Awda)
resonates very strongly among Palestinians, not merely
because of its clear political meaning. The Arabic word for
“Right” (Haq) also means, or connotes, justice/justness,
truth (“definite,” real), and is one of God’s names. Thus,
the connotations the word itself evokes are of a strong,
non-negotiable concept. Its connection to direct imple-
mentation is another question, but, regardless, it is a con-
cept over  which  one cannot conceive of negotiating or
compromising; it is simply a “given.” The Right of Return
has been a central principle in Palestinian collective identi-
ty, and is in fact a central element in the personal identity
of many. The refugee issue and the Right of Return are at
the heart of the Palestinian national ethos and struggle and
enfold memories of the Nakba and the feelings of historical
injustice brought upon the Palestinian people.
What Are Palestinians and Israelis Saying and
Hearing?
Palestinian and Israeli narratives of the past are, more often
than not, mutually exclusive. The debate over the Right of
Return epitomizes these mutually exclusive narratives, and
any principal position-shift on the issue is perceived by each
people to have potential detrimental consequences, on both
practical and symbolic levels. On the practical level this is
perceived to mean “flooding” Israel with refugees and thus
destroying it, on the one hand, or leaving unresolved the
condition of millions of refugees on the other. On a symbolic
level such a position-shift would strike at the core of each
people’s national narrative and collective identity, challen-
ging at once well-established self-perceptions and deeply
held beliefs about the “other.”
For most Israelis, the Right of Return has traditionally
been a taboo, and means nothing less than four million
refugees at Israel’s doorstep the next day. Israelis show little
ability to conceptualize a right separate from its full actua-
lization, and their main reasoning against the Right  of
Return is that it will indeed destroy the State of Israel as a
Jewish state, and perhaps altogether. In other words, it has
both demographic and security-related consequences. Pa-
lestinians’ insistence on their right to return casts them, in
the eyes of Israelis, as seeking to overwhelm Israel with
refugees – in other words, seeking Israel’s destruction.19 If
they do refer to 1948, Israelis for the most part cast the
blame for the creation of the refugee problem on the Pales-
tinians themselves and on the Arab regimes, taking little
blame, if any, for themselves. At best, the events of 1948 are
viewed as natural, or excusable, wartime occurrences.
Following this rationale, Israeli discourse has tended for
many years to treat the refugee issue as a humanitarian one
first and foremost, and any possible action by Israel on this
issue, such as admitting a small number of refugees into
Israel, is framed as a humanitarian act or favour which
Israel is willing to grant the Palestinians as a gesture of good
will. Indeed, such a gesture can only be considered if it is
framed by Israel as such, explicitly denying any Israeli
responsibility, even partial, for the creation of the refugee
problem. This position was reiterated and emphasized once
again by Israeli Prime Minister Barak in the summer of
2000.
Even among Israel’s traditional “peace camp” it is diffi-
cult to find proponents of the Right of Return. A few
months into the current Intifada some of Israel’s leading
intellectuals (all from the Israeli peace camp) issued, in the
Israeli press, a letter to the Palestinian leadership. After
noting that they have struggled for over thirty years for the
two-state solution, the signers forcefully stated that they
shall never be able to agree to the return of the refugees to
within the borders of Israel. Instead, they affirmed that “the
refugees will have the right to return to their homeland,
Palestine, and settle there.” Here again, the letter’s signato-
ries appear to be understanding the issue no differently
from the general public: confusing the issues of the right
and its actual actualization, and rejecting the key Palesti-
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nian demand for recognition of their right to return to their
homes in Israel as well as in the Occupied Territories.
Palestinians, on the other hand, emphasize the political
nature of the problem, and the need for principle recogni-
tion by Israel of its responsibility, whole or partial, for the
events of 1948 and the fate that consequently befell the
Palestinians. To justify and anchor their claims, Palesti-
nians refer to various UN resolutions (mainly 194) and to
concepts of international law in general.
Importantly, notions of “Justice” (also inherent in the
word Haq) are central to Palestinian claims, while the con-
cept is usually absent in Israeli discourse. There is a great
emphasis on the righting of a grave historical wrongdoing.
While Israelis highlight the notion of “symmetry” between
Jewish and Arab refugees, Palestinians emphasize the no-
tion of “equality” and the lack thereof in the relationship
between Israelis and Palestinians. If symmetry is referred to
by Palestinians, it is in a different context, mostly compa-
ring Israeli claims and retributions from Germany to Pales-
tinian claims from Israel.
Palestinians also stress the notion of “choice,” referring
to a personal choice of each refugee. A choice not to return
to one’s home would not imply “giving up” the Right of
Return, but rather would mean that while the right is a
given, the mode of its exercise is a matter of choice. This
concept is mostly absent in Israeli discourse, since in the
concept itself lies one of Israel’s greatest fears – the fear that
all four million refugees would in fact chose to return to
their homes within the 1967 borders of Israel.
Embedded in this concept of choice is the notion that the
Right of Return is a personal right before it is a collective
right. Moreover, to Israelis, “being home” implies, for most
people, living under Israeli sovereignty. In other words,
sovereignty is an attribute of a collective, and Return of the
Jews (both a collective and a personal right) is to this
collective, sovereign entity. It is difficult for Israelis to con-
ceptualize the much more salient attachments Palestinians
have to their particular place (city, village, house) of origin.
While notions of nationality, statehood, and sovereignty
are dynamic and ever evolving, it is still difficult to say at
this point that most Palestinian refugees regard anywhere
under Palestinian national sovereignty as “home.”
Some Palestinians and Israelis go as far as devising a
concrete plan for the return of all refugees, and claim to
prove that such a solution is entirely feasible and does not
pose any threat to Israel, or that such a threat, if it exists, is
irrelevant.20 This claim, while perhaps “technically” con-
vincing, is not entirely useful. Just as Israelis tend to un-
derestimate or completely overlook the meaning
Palestinians attribute to the issues of “refugees” and “Re-
turn,” so do such plans tend to ignore, or deem unimpor-
tant, Israeli fears (demographic and security-related). The
issue of “physical space” to absorb the refugees is hardly the
most central concern of most Israelis.
The general run of Palestinians for the most part hold (or
at least widely express outwardly) maximalist demands
with regard to the actualization of the Right of Return.21 In
a sense, the Palestinians are entrapped in their demand to
recognize the Right of Return. They have invested too much
in trying to secure this right, and would lose face (to others
as well as to themselves) if they did not achieve a satisfactory
agreement of some sort. However, most Palestinian leaders
and intellectuals (as well as others) are well aware that Israel
is unlikely to agree to the actual return of all refugees. For
the most part, the Palestinian leadership seeks some formal
and principle recognition of Palestinian rights and a choi-
ce-based approach which will provide the refugees with a
variety of structured options. These options, which would
be accompanied by a variety of incentives and disincentives,
may be formulated in a way such that only a few will actually
choose to return to Israel.22 The formulation of this appro-
ach, however, must also satisfy (at least to some degree) the
Palestinians’ need, or demand, for an official acceptance of
responsibility on the part of the state of Israel.
Another important difference between Palestinian and
Israeli discourses is that while Israelis tend to be forward-
bound – taking historical points of reference (mostly 1967)
as “instrumental” (mainly to themselves, since preserving
some sort of status quo better serves the stronger party in
the conflict) in reaching a future solution – Palestinians are
still very much bound to the past, to the events of 1948.
Moreover, while Israelis emphasize an “end to the conflict,”
Palestinians express more concern with historical justice.
What Does All This Tell Us?
Conflict, in effect, can be conceptualized as a constructed
discourse. Conceptualizing the “Right of Return” as such
places it within the wider discursive and institutional conti-
nuities within which it is embedded.23 Thus, discourse regar-
ding the Right of Return must be examined in relation to
discourses about the conflict at large, as well as discourses
on identities, history, etc., prevalent among Palestinians and
Israelis. Examining the nature of, and reasons for, the appa-
rent impasse with regard to the Right of Return may indeed
shed light on, and be informed by, the larger context of the
conflict.
Discussion between Israelis and Palestinians on the Right
of Return in particular, and on the conflict in general, takes
place on different discursive planes, since the different
realms of meaning upon which the discourses draw have
little, if anything, in common. These separate discourses both
construct and delimit each peoples’ own reality, as well as
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their interpretations of the other’s reality. As Khalidi puts
it:
In a sense, each party to this conflict, and every other claimant,
operates in a different dimension from the other, looking back
to a different era of the past, and living in a different present,
albeit in the very same place.24
The “Dialogue of the Deaf” between Palestinians and
Israelis, or the entanglement surrounding the Right of Re-
turn, is the result of a number of different factors and most
likely a combination of them all: their worlds of meaning
are incongruent with one another, and concepts reverbe-
rate very differently – linguistically, culturally and otherwi-
se – within both communities. Language, culture, and
discourse all have features in common, as claims Foucault:
they belong, within a given context, to the same system of
formation and serve to construct and delimit the way peo-
ple make meaning of the world around them.
At face value it seems that when discussing the Right of
Return Palestinians and Israelis are talking about the same
thing and simply not agreeing on it; in other words, that the
demands, or aspirations, of both sides with regard to the
Right of Return are simply irreconcilable and that the con-
flict is indeed of zero-sum nature. A closer look, however,
reveals that not only is each side often not really hearing
what the other is saying but that this “Dialogue of the Deaf”
is one of the central symptoms of the conflict, as well as a
main cause for its perpetuation.
“Peace talks” between Palestinians and Israelis mostly
regard 1967 as the significant point of reference. This sym-
bolizes a “compromise” and mutual recognition between
Palestinians and Israelis, and supposedly constitutes a wor-
kable framework for future political arrangements. How-
ever, this framework also enables the parties (mostly Israel,
for whom the “status quo” is more convenient) to avoid
confronting the origins and core of the conflict – which in
the eyes of Palestinians in fact lie further back in history.
Withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza
and even the dismantling of settlements in those areas are
more technicalities, or “cosmetics,” which treat the actual
physical occupation of Palestinians civilians by Israelis as
the main source of the overall conflict. While most may
agree that this is the most immediate source of conflict, and
especially of its escalation over the past two years, for
Palestinians 1948 still constitutes the formative event in
their collective national history as well as in the personal
history and memory of many, and the real core of the conflict.
The difference in interpreting the Right of Return por-
trays, among other things, the debate over responsibility for
the events of 1948,25 as well as the different historical
landmarks to which each party is alluding. The recognition
by Israel of a Palestinian Right of Return even in principle
is problematic, since it would challenge the Israeli national
identity and meta-narrative by implying responsibility for
the fate of the Palestinians, and possibly cast a shadow on
Israel’s righteousness and legitimacy (cornerstones of the
Jewish/Israeli national ethos). Not only are the issues of the
war or the fate of the refugees problematic, but the fact that
Israel possibly could not have come into being, or survived,
without the drastic demographic shift in its favour due to
the expulsion and fleeing of so many Palestinians, is a hard
issue for Israel to confront. Thus, for Israelis, accepting the
Palestinian Right of Return (together with a share of the
responsibility for the formation of the Palestinian refugee
problem) is seen as having detrimental consequences. For
Palestinians, relinquishing the Right of Return would ren-
der over fifty years of struggle meaningless. In fact, the very
core of the Palestinians’ identity and plight would be left
unanswered.
Conveniently, it has been possible to discuss, albeit
somewhat superficially, all other technicalities while eva-
ding the core of the conflict. In other words, being “deaf”
has often been a strategic choice consciously made by Israe-
lis and Palestinians (mostly the leaders), which has served
their different agendas, and has not prevented them from
reaching a number of agreements. However, the sustaina-
bility of these agreements is in question so long as other core
issues, such as the Right or Return and all it entails, remain
unresolved. Real reconciliation can begin only once the
weight of history has been shouldered.26 Once the conflict’s
bedrock lies bare there may be no choice left but to finally
confront it.
Mutual  deafness, or blindness, in fact exists between
Israelis and Palestinians throughout their relationship and
negotiations at large, with regard to most issues pertaining
to the conflict and the peace process. To overcome this
obstacle, the importance of which is usually underestima-
ted, it is necessary to recognize that Israelis and Palestinians
indeed do not hear each other, do not see each other, and
do not understand each other’s realities. Even when they
are seemingly discussing the same issue, they may in fact
attribute to it entirely different meanings. Currently, Pales-
tinians and Israelis operate in completely different realms
of meaning, with hardly any overlap. While shared meaning
may be too much to ask for at this point, compatible
meanings  are more attainable. A sustainable agreement
would thus need to be worded and delivered in a way that
addresses the core concerns of Palestinians and Israelis and
resonates well with both peoples.
In trying to reach a sustainable agreement it is also
important to recognize that meaning is dynamic, subject to
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the workings of discursive and other processes, and that the
past as well as the future are looked at from within the
context of the present. What seems unbridgeable and in-
conceivable today may well be possible tomorrow, if we
better understand these processes. The Right of Return, too,
may come to mean something different than it currently
does to Palestinians and to Israelis once their respective
political realities change.
Overcoming existing hurdles will also require new and
creative ways of thinking and the continuous challenging of
long-held myths and deep-seated taboos. Not only will the
past have to be re-examined, so will the range of conceivably
possible future scenarios.
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